GRÉCIA, UM ANO APÓS O EMPRÉSTIMO DO FMI – OU O CAOS VINDO DO FMI E DA EUROPA
Quadro em baixo com a lista dos maiores credores da Grécia.
Dívida grega: 340 biliões de euros
O recente pacote financeiro grego ainda não foi aprovado. Faltam despachar para a Grécia 12 biliôes de euros.
Desde que o governo grego aplique ainda mais medidas de austeridade.
Sondagens dão rejeições do acordo de 80%.
Paul Mason da BBC mostra como o desacordo na sociedade grega e a completa distancia entre as elites europeias/ o governo grego e a população grega está ao rubro.
O Estado Grego começa a perder a sua capacidade para desempenhar as suas funções e para ter controlo político sobre os seus agentes.
There is a social crisis under way and I think it is different from the one our history books teach us to expect. It’s not like the cracking of the state, or mass unrest, but simply that the Greek state – whose reach was never far into society – is beginning to lose its grip slightly on the actual functions a state should do.
It cannot decide its economic policy; it can’t convince its own people of any good intent; the rule of law is imposed hard here – with the impounding of yachts bought through tax evasion – only to break down somewhere else, as people begin to pledge non-payment of bills for the privatised utilities… the violence is a sideshow: it is the political paralysis of the Greek government that is of world importance because – while the European Union bickers about how much bankers should lose versus how much the EU should lose as Greece defaults – you are seeing the lines of defence against financial and social chaos within this part of Europe getting very frayed…
I think the level of mismatch between perception and reality within the Eurozone is worrying. Because last year’s protests were mainly leftist; and the strikes mainly token, a pattern of thinking has emerged that dismisses all Greek protest as essentially this.
But a new situation is emerging: Greek people I have spoken to are beginning to express things in terms of nation and sovereignty – and this makes the Greek situation different, for now, to Ireland and Portugal.
Os gregos estão também a voltar-se – legitimamente – contra a comunicação social mainstream. Como Paul Mason explica.
And I will repeat the point about hostility to the media: it’s not a problem for me and my colleagues to be hounded off demos as “representatives of big capital”, “Zionists”, “scum and police informers” etc. But to get this reaction from almost every demographic – from balaclava kids to pensioners – should be a warning sign to the policymaking elite. The “mainstream” – whether it’s the media, politicians or business people – is beginning to seem illegitimate to large numbers of people.
As one old bloke put it to me, when I said: “Don’t you want us to report what’s happening to you?” – “No.”
He was quite calm and rational as he waved his hand in my face: “It’s too late for that.”